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ABSTRACT-When the Comanches, a Native American commu-
nity originally from the Great Basin region, migrated to the Southern 
Plains in the early 1700s, they encountered Spanish colonies, missions, 
and military and administrative personnel as well as newly introduced 
trade items. Spain attempted to incorporate the Comanches into the 
region's emerging political economy through a variety of means includ-
ing the use of treaties, coercive force, and economic inducements. Be-
cause of the Comanches' decentralized political organization, their 
conquest of the Apaches, and Spain's tenuous control over its northern 
frontier, the Comanches successfully retained control over their own 
articulation within the region's political economy. In order to examine 
the means by which the Comanches retained their independence, this 
paper explores the Comanches' decentralized political organization, re-
lations with the Apaches, and strategic responses to trade agreements and 
peace accords offered by the Spanish. 
KEY WORDS: Ecueracapa, Kotsoteka, division, band, Toro Blanco, incorpo-
ration 
Introduction 
Like many other Native communities residing on the Great Plains 
during the 1700s, Comanches migrated into the region from elsewhere. 
According to an oral tradition among the Shoshones, the Comanches sepa-
rated from the Shoshones in the Great Basin due to an argument over the 
division of game (Grinnell 1920:260). In 1706 the first written account of 
the Comanches residing on the Great Plains appeared in a letter sent by a 
Spanish military commander to the governor of New Mexico (Thomas 
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1935:16). Once in the region, the Comanches rapidly expanded their land 
base. By the middle of the 18th century, the Comanches ranged from the 
upper Rio Grande area to central Texas (Hamiilainen 2001:41). Until blocked 
by the United States in the 1870s, the Comanches' territorial expansion 
continued southward to the Llano Estacado area and eastward along the 
Arkansas, Cimmarron, Canadian, and Red Rivers (Thwaites 1908:85-88; 
Hackett 1941:334-63; Hamalainen 2001:47;). (Fig. 1). 
The Comanches' ability to increase and consolidate territory during 
the 1700s has been attributed to numerous causes. The most salient of these 
include the Comanches' mobility and population increases (Anderson 1999), 
their incorporation into Spain's political economy (Hall 1989), an ability to 
control trade (Hamalainen 2001), their appeasement by Spain (Kavanagh 
1996), their military prowess (Richardson 1933), their defeat of the Apaches 
(Thomas 1932), and their periodic alliances with both the French and the 
Spanish (Weber 1992). Each of these ideas explains a definite aspect of the 
Comanches' political and economic successes in the Southern Plains. As 
militarily prepared nomads, with periodic alliances with the French and 
Spanish, the Comanches became a force to be appeased. In addition, the 
Comanches' ability to extract colonial commodities from traders aided their 
ability to expand and consolidate territory. Less clear, however, is how the 
Comanches managed to flourish both economically and politically when so 
many other Native communities of that era failed to do so. 
Through the works of a number of recent scholars (John 1975; Gelo 
1987, 2001; Hall 1989; Weber 1992; Kavanagh 1996; Anderson 1999; and 
HlimaIainen 2000), as well as translated Spanish documents, the Comanches' 
ability to not only survive but flourish during the 1700s becomes clearer. 
Like Hall (1989) and Hamalainen (2001), it is my contention that the most 
fruitful means for understanding the importance of the Comanches' political 
economy during the 1700s is by examining Spain's colonial policies in the 
region. In addition, it is equally necessary to explore the Comanches' decen-
tralized political organization as well as their relations with the Apaches. By 
focusing on these three factors, the strategies used by the Comanches to 
resist incorporation into Spain's political economy during the 1700s be-
comes more transparent. 
Incorporation is a key concept in a world-systems approach and refers 
to the integration of differing political economies (Chase-Dunn and Hall 
1997:65). Incorporation does not occur among equals, however. Instead, 
one political and economic system will dominate the relationship. When 
successful, the end result is referred to as "effective or real incorporation" 
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as this level of integration causes "a situation in which the patterns of 
production and reproduction typical of external arenas have ceased to be 
dominant within the region and tend to disintegrate qua systems" (Arrighi 
1979: 162). As Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997:65) noted, the process occurs 
along a "continuum, not as a series of stages." 
In the case of the Comanches, incorporation failed to occur during 
Spain's colonial era (1680-1821). The independence of the Comanches can 
be related to a number of external and internal factors. External variables 
include Spain's lack of financial commitment to the region (Scholes 1975), 
a dearth of colonial personnel (Johns 1975), and an ongoing geopolitical 
rivalry with France (Weber 1992). As will be shown, the most critical 
internal variable relates to the decentralized political organization of the 
Comanches. Additionally, a region containing few valuable resources can 
forestall incorporation into the political economy of a seemingly more 
powerful government (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997:72). 
In order to better understand the persistence of the Comanches' inde-
pendence and their lack of incorporation into Spain's colonial political 
economy, this paper focuses on the Comanches' internal political organiza-
tion, their relations with the Apaches, and their ability to negotiate favorable 
trade accords and peace agreements offered by local Spanish officials. 
Results and Discussion 
The Comanches' Decentralized Political Organization 
Spain faced an insurmountable barrier in their attempts to forge a 
favorable political and economic linkage with the Comanches. Although 
colonial officials wanted to work with Comanche leaders (Kavanagh 1996), 
the decentralized nature of the Comanches' political and economic structure 
precluded such an arrangement. The Comanches' recognition of numerous 
leaders rather than one centralizing authority, was critical to this failure 
(Foster 1991). Consequently, if one leader negotiated an agreement with the 
Spanish, the other leaders and their followers were not bound by the condi-
tions of the accord. 
Like many nomadic Native communities in North America, the 
Comanches were divided into a series of bands that periodically merged into 
larger units (Foster \991). The number of bands recognized by the 
Comanches varied through time. According to Curtis (1926: 187), "At the 
climax of their existence the Comanches were apparently divided into ten or 
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more bands, but through tribal disintegration this band organization IS 
almost lost." 
Internal organization of these bands appears to have been kin-based 
structures led by a charismatic leader who exhibited military prowess and 
sustained regular access to spiritual forces (Kavanagh 1996:42-43). Pres-
ently, no consensus exists concerning the degree of control that leaders of 
bands maintained over their followers. Using examples from Spanish and 
ethnohistorical sources, Kavanagh (1996:37-38), concluded that these lead-
ers exhibited "the culturally defined ability to influence the behavior of 
others." Alternately, Foster (1991:68), Hoebel (1940:47), and Wallace and 
Hoebel (1952: 124-25) surmised that these leaders could not have exercised 
coercive force over their followers, nor negotiated unilaterally binding 
agreements with other related bands. Richardson (1929:65) noted, for ex-
ample, "the nomadic habits of the Indians and the resultant divisions and 
subdivisions of the bands into small parties away from responsible leaders 
made it impossible for the chiefs to control their own men." 
Furthermore, Spanish officials complained continually about the lack 
of control band leaders wielded over their followers. In 1750 the governor 
of New Mexico bitterly deplored the behavior of the Comanches trading at 
pueblos along the upper Rio Grande: 
[A]s always, whenever the occasion arises for stealing horses or 
attacking the pueblos of Pecos of Galisteo, they do not fail to take 
advantage of it. ... They excuse themselves by blaming other of 
their nation, saying that among them are warlike captains who 
commit outrages and those who are well disposed are unable to 
prevent them. They always say that they know nothing about it. As 
there is no organization or authority among these Indians. (Hackett 
1941:328) 
Predictably, leaders' practice of publicly eschewing their capacity to 
control band members frustrated colonial efforts to use these leaders as a 
means to garner control over the Comanches. For example, the governor of 
New Mexico continued to complain in 1750 about the Comanches' lack of 
strong leadership. According to Hackett's translation of the governor's 
letter (Hackett 1941:323), the administrator described the Comanches as "a 
very barbarous people, heathen, very disorganized, and obeying no head; 
but they are well supplied with arms such as arrows, hatchets, lances, 
swords, and a few muskets" 
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From the 1750s through the 1780s, Spain funded a number of fact-
finding missions to acquire more information about the internal political 
organization of the Comanches (Kessell 1979:167, 507-12). Hiring past 
French traders and reliable Spanish officials, the colonial government ob-
tained useful data concerning the Comanches' political organization, rela-
tions with other indigenous communities, population size, and trading 
alliances (Kavanagh 1996:76). Reports related to these missions deter-
mined that the Comanches supported both bands and divisions and that 
neither one of these organizations maintained centralizing authorities 
(Kavanagh 1996:76). These accounts also noted that the Comanches were 
mobile and traded captives and buffalo hides for tobacco, knives, axes, and 
beads (Bolton 1914:94-95). 
According to one of the expedition leaders, by the 1780s the 
Comanches' popUlation consisted of at least 20,000 individuals, represent-
ing numerous bands and recognizing at least three divisions (Marin del 
Valle, quoted in Anderson 1999:217). Presumably, Spanish authorities 
wanted to obtain this type of information in order to more successfully 
negotiate peace and trade accords with the Comanches. Unfortunately for 
the Spanish, however, the leadership associated with the divisions main-
tained no more control over their members than did the leaders of bands 
(Foster 1991). 
Researchers currently studying the Comanches continue to grapple 
with the functional role and structure of the divisions. Foster (1991 :70) 
argued that "Comanche social structure is best understood as the strategic 
movement and organization of personnel among different social groups, 
regulated by means of periodic multigroup gatherings." In his view, leaders 
of these gatherings were ephemeral in nature and lacked power: 
The leaders who from time to time represented divisions or 
suprabands to Euro-American authorities were intermediaries with 
limited authority. They dealt with Euro-Americans on specific 
matters relating to Comanche-Euro-American interactions and were 
not "paramount" or "principal" leaders in the way that we usually 
employ the term. (Foster 1991 :68) 
Kavanagh (1996:53-54) disagreed with Foster's view of divisions as 
utilitarian units existing solely to respond to specific events. Instead, he 
described these entities as "political organizations composed of local resi-
dential bands linked by kinship and social ties with a commonality of 
Marginal Incorporation of the Comanches by the Spanish 375 
interest in group affairs, war, peace, and trade." Unlike Foster (1991:68), 
Kavanagh (1996:53-54) perceived these divisions as enduring structures 
stabilized by permanent leaders. With the exception of Kavanagh, most 
authorities support the view that not only did the leaders of bands exert 
minimal authority over their members, but the heads of divisions also 
lacked monolithic power over their followers. 
Divisions did playa more prominent role in trading and raiding ven-
tures than did the bands (Foster 1991). Pragmatically, the divisions' popu-
lation size and inclusion of a number of band leaders permitted these entities 
to secure more commodities than bands working independently (Kavanagh 
1996:48). Kavanagh (1996:121) found that 
One [division] east of Pecos and Galisteo was particularly hostile 
toward those pueblos and against any Europeans they met. The 
other [division], northeast of Taos, maintained trade with that pueblo 
and peacefully passed along French traders. 
Colonial officials noted that the Comanches traded peacefully at Taos 
but once the trading season ended, the Comanches regularly attacked the 
Galisteo Pueblo (Simmons 1968:112-14). Lacking easy access to Spanish 
markets, two of the Comanches' divisions maintained stable trading rela-
tions with non-Spanish Europeans and a lucrative raiding economy against 
Spanish settlers in Texas (Hamalainen 1998:505). Miller (1975:172-73) 
noted that the divisions residing along the Arkansas River traded captives, 
horses, and hides to the French for firearms, textiles, and metal objects. 
By the late 1700s American merchants had extended their trade be-
yond Texas and into Mexico (Loomis and Nasatir 1967:3). Stock raiding 
from Spanish ranches provided a major economic opportunity for various 
divisions and bands of the Comanches (Guy and Sheridan 1998:3). When 
the Spanish confronted leaders about hostilities committed by the 
Comanches, these leaders refused to take responsibility. As one division 
leader noted, he had been ill and unable to control his followers, thus 
permitting the culprits to flee the region (Kavanagh 1996: 151). This decen-
tralized system limited Spain's ability to sanction offenders. Even if specific 
culprits were identified, the frequent movements of the Comanches and the 
permeability of their bands and divisions (Hoebel 1940) hindered the ability 
of colonial administrators to pursue the matter. A lack of critical manpower, 
financial support, and any centralizing authority among the Comanches 
stymied Spain's attempts to gain control over the Comanches. 
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Relations between the Comanches, Spanish, and Apaches 
Prior to the arrival of the Comanches into the Southern Plains, various 
Apache groups had a long history of trading with the pueblo an communities 
(Gutierrez 1991). According to Anderson (1999: 117), "the southern Apaches 
filled a void, exploiting many of the old resources and using many of the 
exchange routes that been pioneered by previous groups." Hall (1987) noted 
that the Comanches and Apaches trading with the pueblos fought against 
each other over access to puebloan markets and bison herds. A 1749 peace 
treaty by Spanish administrators with Apaches in the upper Rio Grande area 
probably escalated competition between the Comanches and the Apaches 
for control over these resources (Foster 1991). As early as 1748, the Jicarilla 
Apaches migrated away from their homeland northeast of Santa Fe due to 
attacks by the Comanches (Thomas 1932:59). After the Jicarillas left, some 
Comanches gained direct access not only to French traders traveling along 
the Arkansas River but also to puebloan markets (Bolton 1914:389-407). 
They received a reliable supply of French firearms from Caddoans farther 
east, French traders traveling along the Arkansas River, and illegal Spanish 
traders, referred to as Comancheros, from the puebloan areas (La Vere 
1998:64; Simmons 1968). By the 1750s the Comanches had pushed the 
Apaches south toward El Paso and east toward the Colorado River (Thomas 
1932:63-64). In addition, the Comanches exerted enough influence over the 
region's political and economic landscape in the 1750s to block a proposed 
alliance between the Lipan Apaches and the Hasinais (Smith 1995:71-73). 
Throughout the 1750s and 1760s the Comanches continued to assault 
the settlements of the Apaches. This led to the abandonment of a number of 
missions established by the Spanish for the Apaches (Anderson 1999: 141). 
For example, in 1758 the Comanches, along with various Caddoan groups, 
attacked the San Saba mission (La Vere 1998:57). In 1766 the Comanches 
along with many of their Native allies violently ejected the Apaches from 
the San Lorenzo mission (Tunnell and Newcomb 1969: 171-72). Aiding the 
Comanches and their allies in these battles were the French. Through French 
traders, these Native groups gained access to firearms with which to fight 
not only the Apaches but also the Spanish if necessary (La Vere 1998:56-
57). 
A report submitted by a colonial official in 1768 contained the obser-
vation that the Comanches attacked the Apaches but ignored the Spanish in 
pacified areas (Slatta 1998:87). Consequently, a number of Spanish officials 
suggested that the Spanish should ally with the Comanches against the 
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Apaches (Thomas 1940:61). This placed the Spanish government in an 
awkward predicament, since the Spanish had already negotiated a peace 
accord with the Apaches in 1749. Recognizing the delicacy of the situation, 
it was proposed that the Apaches be given "defective firearms, strong liquor, 
and such other commodities as would render them militarily and economi-
cally dependent on the Spaniards" (Officer 1987:62). 
Before this policy could be instituted, the Comanches continued not 
only to attack the Apaches but also to pillage markets held at puebloan 
towns (Thomas 1932: 136). Due to the boldness and frequency of these 
attacks, Juan Anza, while governor of New Mexico, organized a campaign 
against the Comanches in 1779. During this battle, Anza's troops managed 
to kill Cuerno Verde, a major division leader (Thomas 1932: 136, 142). After 
this defeat, Anza offered peace terms to the Comanches but only some 
members of one division accepted the arrangement (Kavanagh 1996:93). 
By 1787 the Spanish changed their policies toward the Comanches. At 
that time, the colonial government decided to aid the Comanches in their 
efforts to vanquish the Apaches (Slatta 1998:88). A provision in Spain's 
agreement with the Comanches promised the tribe horses and weaponry to 
aid in their struggle against the Apaches (Thomas 1932:318). In return, the 
Comanches agreed to continue to not only fight the Apaches independently 
but also to participate in joint military campaigns with the Spanish against 
the Apaches. Adoption of this policy probably resulted from Spain's recog-
nition that the Comanches had already displaced the Apaches from the 
eastern margins of the puebloan region. In 1787 the Spanish organized 
various Native tribes, including the Comanches, to fight the Apaches (Slatta 
1998:88). With this military help, the Comanches outmaneuvered the re-
maining Apaches by removing them from their homeland and by controlling 
their alliances (Smith 1995; Slatta 1998). According to one Spanish official, 
at the hands of the Comanches, "All the [Apache] adults of both sexes may 
be excluded from this mercy [sold into slavery], notwithstanding that it 
appears to us that everyone captured will be destined to suffer death" 
(Thomas 1932:336). 
Spanish Efforts to Negotiate an Alliance with the Comanches 
Until the 1763 Treaty of Paris, in which France gave its territory in the 
southern United States to the Spanish, Spain's policies toward the 
Comanches revolved around combatting the influence French administra-
tors sought to gain over the Comanches. Until France's loss of its territory 
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to Spain, French policy continually expanded its sphere of influence through 
trade alliances (La Vere 1998:57). This colonial rivalry served the 
Comanches well. According to one Spanish governor (Thomas 1940:36), 
"the province could not afford an extended war and might, in the meantime, 
drive the Comanches to a dependence upon the French." In addition, war-
fare against nomadic populations is exceedingly difficult. As Ferguson and 
Whitehead (1992: 19) noted, "Protracted campaigns against people without 
any central authority, living in small mobile settlements are very costly, if 
not logistically impossible." 
Invariably, peace treaties offered to the Comanches by the Spanish 
lacked enough inducements for the Comanches to accept peace, which led 
each accord to rapidly collapse (Thomas 1932, 1940). And as mentioned 
earlier, Spain's unwillingness to commit more resources to the empire's 
northern frontier prevented local officials from weaning the Comanches 
from the trade goods offered by the French (Thomas 1940:129-43). Colo-
nial administrators negotiating with the Comanches more often than not 
were responding to extortion rather than seducing the Comanches into 
Spain's regional economy (Hall 1989:153). On a regular basis, groups of 
Comanches, probably divisions, repeatedly attacked trading fairs sponsored 
by the Spanish (Kavanagh 1996:48; Hackett 1941:328). 
Ultimately, the Comanches were a greater threat to Spain's continual 
occupation of the region than vice versa. Since the Spanish controlled the 
technology for producing critical resources, it was to the advantage of the 
Comanches to allow Spain's colonial settlements to remain in the northern 
frontier and to permit the continual operation of trade centers. In addition, 
it did not serve the Spanish well to completely alienate the Comanches 
because of the proximity of the French (Thomas 1940:129-43). 
Like the French, British, and later the Americans, the Spanish were not 
averse to using intra- or inter-Indian conflict to their own advantage 
(Moorhead 1975:58-61). Tensions between differing groups of Comanches 
resulting from their alternative strategies for negotiating with the Spanish 
might have weakened the bargaining power of the Comanches had the 
community not supported a decentralized system of government. Consen-
sual decisions concerning the most strategic response to a more powerful 
nation's offers are not often easily formed. All too frequently, factions may 
form in which "some leaders advocate attack, others conciliation; some 
take followers closer to the frontier, others lead into the wilderness, some 
assimilate, while other valorize local tradition" (Ferguson and Whitehead 
1992: 17). 
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In the Comanches' case, tensions erupted between the leadership of 
their three divisions. In 1786 the Spanish attempted to centralize these three 
divisions under the leadership of Ecueracapa, a powerful individual from 
the Kotsoteka organization. Unlike earlier peace attempts, this newest one 
offered military aid and regular gifts, and promised to sponsor regularly 
scheduled markets in the puebloan region. Additionally, Spanish merchants 
agreed to regulate the prices charged for commodities sold at these events 
(Thomas 1932:304). One year after the peace agreement, eight fairs had 
been held in the region (Concha [1794] 1951:241). 
Salaries were also a part of Spanish diplomacy. Along with monies 
paid in pesos, leaders were given cloth, blankets, combs, weaponry, and 
numerous other items to distribute among their followers (Thomas 1932:318, 
384). The leaders of the western Kotsotekas, however, received more goods 
and a larger salary than did other divisional leaders. Like other expanding 
colonial governments, the Spanish attempted to elevate a friendly leader, 
giving this person "titles, emblems, and active political and military sup-
port" (Ferguson and Whitehead 1992: 13). According to New Mexico's 
governor, the elevation of one leader over all other Comanches will result in 
this individual supporting Spanish policies over the demands of the 
Comanches (Thomas 1932:302). 
Predictably, the western Kotsotekas provided the most enthusiastic 
support for Spain's newest attempt at peace. Immediately, representatives of 
this division met with leaders of the eastern Kotsotekas and the other two 
divisions in order to gain their support for the Spanish initiative (Kavanagh 
1996). Two major roadblocks emerged which prevented the entire nation of 
Comanches from accepting this peace accord. First, the western Kotsotekas 
derived resources from different sources than did the other divisions. The 
western Kotsotekas received enough commodities from the Spanish that it 
was not necessary for them to seek alternative sources. The other divisions 
relied more closely on foreign nationals as well as raiding activities to meet 
their needs. Second, the governor of New Mexico demanded that the 
Comanches elect one leader, specifically Ecueracapa, a leader of the west-
ern Kotsotekas (Thomas 1932:318). 
Toro Blanco, a leader associated with the other two divisions, resisted 
this turn of events. Refusing to enter into any agreement, he became an 
enemy of the Kotsotekas (Thomas 1932:307). During the spring of 1786, 
followers of Ecueracapa assassinated Toro Blanco and a number of his 
followers (Thomas 1932:229). Although Toro Blanco died, individuals sym-
pathetic to his cause survived. Throughout Ecueracapa's reign, members of 
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the two divisions once led by Toro Blanco continued to raid Spanish settle-
ments (Thomas 1969:299; Kavanagh 1996:116). After Ecueracapa's reign 
ended with his death in 1793, various Comanches from the western 
Kotsotekas briefly filled the office (Kavanagh 1996: 143; Simmons 1967:31). 
By 1801, however, the Comanches had rid themselves of this office created 
by the Spanish. 
Conclusion 
Spain's centralization of the Comanches' political organization proved 
to be a dismal failure. Had Ecueracapa and his successors had real power, 
they could have kept their brethren from raiding the Spanish and trading 
with foreigners. As Spain learned more about the Comanches, they began to 
tailor their peace accords to the needs of the Comanches. Consequently, 
officials offered to ally with the Comanches against the Apaches and to hold 
regularly scheduled markets with fixed prices. In return, these administra-
tors wanted to reconcile the decentralized political organization of the 
Comanches with the more centralized colonial government. Spain's failure 
in this regard stemmed from their lack of understanding about the inherent 
autonomy of the Comanches' bands and divisions. Although Spain came 
close to incorporating the western Kotsotekas into Spain's colonial milieu, 
they could not gain control over the other divisions and bands. 
Unable to sustain Ecueracapa's control over the other divisions, the 
Comanches maintained control over their involvement in the -region's po-
litical economy. In addition, because of the presence of multiple leaders, all 
of whom denied the ability to control their followers, the Comanches man-
aged to retain their independence from policies emanating from Spain's 
colonial government. Ultimately, in the case of the Comanches, political 
decentralization proved to be an adaptive system for forestalling annihila-
tion or incorporation into Spain's colonial political economy. 
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